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Abstract
We analyze ￿nancial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model
with three types of agents - shareholders, bondholders and workers - that di⁄er in par-
ticipation in the capital market and in terms of risk aversion. Aggregate productivity
and distribution risk are shared among these agents via the bond market and via an
e¢ cient labor contract. The result is a combination of volatile returns to capital and
a highly cyclical consumption process for the shareholders, which are two important
ingredients for generating high and countercyclical risk premiums. These risk premi-
ums are consistent with a strong propagation mechanism through an elastic supply of
labor, rigid real wages and a countercyclical labor share. We discuss the implications
for the real and nominal component of the risk premium on equity and bonds. We
show how these premiums react to changes in the volatility of the shocks, as experi-
enced during the great moderation. We also analyze the e⁄ects of changes in monetary
policy behavior and the resulting in￿ ation dynamics.
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11 Introduction
Time variation in risk premiums is generally considered an important driving process for
asset price ￿ uctuations and therefore may also contribute to real ￿ uctuations in the economy.
Economic models typically have a hard time reproducing the observed risk premiums and real
statistics simultaneously. The need for such a consistent model is high. For instance, it would
make it possible to extract the information contained in asset prices about future growth
and in￿ ation expectations of private investors by controlling for the implied risk premiums.
At the same time, a model that can jointly match ￿nancial and real statistics would have
strong empirical validity. The standard DSGE model with endogenous capital and labor has
problems generating su¢ ciently large premiums and realistic real statistics because investors
have various channels through which they can smooth consumption. Various solutions have
been suggested in the literature to overcome this problem within the standard representative
agent model. Recent examples include, among others, Lettau and Uhlig (2000) who evaluate
the potential role of habit formation, Boldrin et al. (2001) suggest frictions in the labor
allocation between sectors, Uhlig (2007) proposes real wage rigidity as a possible solution.
In this paper, we follow Guvenen (2008), Danthine and Donaldson (2002) and Danthine et
al. (2006), and focus on the role of heterogeneous capital market participation across agents.
This setup implies a number of interesting features that can facilitate the joint explanation of
real and ￿nancial statistics. First, in such a setup, it is no longer aggregate consumption that
drives the pricing kernel of asset prices. There is a well documented literature that suggests
that the consumption of wealthy agents, that hold the majority of the capital stock, is more
volatile than aggregate consumption. Second, in a context of heterogeneous agents, the val-
uation of the capital stock is not only determined by aggregate risk, but also by distribution
risk. The volatile and highly procyclical nature of pro￿ts can potentially contribute signi￿-
cantly to the explanation of the equity risk premium and can help to di⁄erentiate between
stock and bond risk premiums. The risk sharing between heterogeneous agents does not only
a⁄ect the pricing of the claims on future pro￿ts but also o⁄ers the natural context to explain
the observed acyclical behavior of real wages and the countercyclical behavior of the wage
share. Third, an explanation of the risk premium based on heterogeneous capital market
participation across agents has important empirical implications for the ￿nancial behavior
of the di⁄erent agents, for instance in terms of wealth accumulation and the resulting wealth
distribution. Therefore, this approach has the advantage that the underlying assumptions
can be validated more easily compared to alternative explanations which are often based on
non-observable features of the utility functions (another popular solution to the equity pre-
mium in the context of a representative agent model). We implement such a heterogeneous
agent structure in an otherwise standard DSGE model with monopolistic competitive ￿rms,
nominal rigidities and a monetary policy reaction function.
As a ￿rst contribution, we show that this model, driven by a combination of aggregate
productivity and distribution shocks, is able to generate signi￿cant risk premiums. The
model also produces realistic statistics for real aggregate volatilities and correlations. In
particular, the optimal labor contract, motivated by risk sharing considerations, explains
the observed rigidity and low volatility in the real wage, as well as the countercyclical wage
share. Nominal rigidities, optimal wage contracts and stochastic distribution risk -which
takes up possible shifts in the relative bargaining power of workers and ￿rms- deliver a high
2volatility in pro￿ts, returns to equity and price-dividend ratios. This high volatility in the
returns from capital, combined with the high concentration of capital market participation,
results in a concentration of risk and a high consumption volatility for the shareholders. We
analyze how the di⁄erent features of the model contribute to generating such signi￿cant risk
premiums.
Second, the joint focus on a variety of assets (nominal and real bonds, as well as stocks)
imposes additional discipline in building the model. For one, reproducing observed di⁄er-
ences in returns to stocks and bonds has implications for the degree of ￿ exibility one has in
modelling the agents￿stochastic discount factor. Moreover, the macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
that underlie the various risk premiums are model-consistent. Put di⁄erently, the general
equilibrium framework adopted ensures a joint explanation, without relying on, e.g., reduced
form macroeconomic dynamics to mimic risk premiums. In addition to internal consistency,
this allows for the possibility of feedback e⁄ects from risk premiums to the real economy.
We also analyze the role of monetary policy in the model. The way in which the central
bank responds to in￿ ation is, obviously, of great importance to relative variations in real and
nominal risk premiums, as well as the macroeconomy. In this sense, our paper complements
papers studying bond and equity premiums in representative agent models with sticky prices
and monetary policy. Examples of the latter approach include H￿rdahl et al. (2007), De
Paoli et al. (2007), Ravenna and Sepp￿l￿ (2007) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
The third contribution of the paper is applied in nature. We estimate the series of pro-
ductivity and distribution shocks for the period 1947-2007 and feed them into the model.
Taking into account the limited stochastic structure of this exercise, the resulting time vari-
ation in risk premiums compares well to available proxies and estimates in the literature.
We perform predictive regressions for stocks and bonds to further understand the success
and limitations of the model. Finally, we provide some evidence on the potential e⁄ects of
the Great Moderation on the variety of risk premiums.
In section 2, we present the model and its calibration. Section 3 documents the main
￿nancial and real statistics implied by the model, and compares them with analogue statistics
in the data and implied statistics of the representative agent version of the model. The
speci￿c role of the utility function and the di⁄erent risk sharing arrangements in the model
are explained. In section 4, the di⁄erent components of the risk premiums are analyzed
in more detail. The di⁄erence between the equity and bond premium is discussed as well
as the real and the nominal component of the premium. Section 5 presents the results
on the implied time variation in the risk premiums, and shows how such variation a⁄ects
the behavior of the price-dividend ratio and the yield spread. In section 6, we illustrate
how the risk premiums depend on the stochastic structure by showing the potential impact
of the Great Moderation. Finally, we document how the risk premiums and their nominal
component, in particular, interact with the assumptions about monetary policy and in￿ ation
rigidity. Our analysis is based on simulation experiments with the ￿rst, second and third
order approximation of the non-linear model using the Dynare and Dynare++ toolbox.
32 The Model
We start from a general setup which considers three types of agents. A ￿rst group of agents
consists of the standard portfolio investors that allocate their wealth between stocks and
bonds. These agents act as the marginal investors that clear the bond and stock markets.
Therefore, their stochastic discount factor will determine the pricing of the corresponding
risks. Motivated by empirical evidence, we assume that the portfolio managers are character-
ized by a lower risk aversion than the other agents in the economy. We refer to these agents
as type 1 agents. A second group of agents (type 2) participates in the capital market by
buying bonds. Their bondholdings depend on their desire to smooth consumption as well as
their precautionary savings, and determine the wealth accumulation of these agents. Finally,
a third group of agents (type 3), the workers, does not participate in the capital market and
consumes immediately its income from labor. In order to smooth their marginal utility, these
agents are completely dependent on the labor contract which provides the only opportunity
for them to share their income risk with the other agents in the economy, in particular with
the shareholders as owners of the ￿rms. In a context of continued labor-￿rm relations, the
optimal labor contract guarantees a predetermined relation between the marginal utility of
the workers and the marginal utility of the shareholder of the ￿rms. More risk averse type
2 and type 3 agents will try to transfer some of the aggregate risk towards the shareholders,
either via savings in the bond market or via the wage contract. In exchange the shareholders
will require a higher return.
This general setting allows us to review speci￿c cases that have been considered previ-
ously in the literature. When the economy is vacated by shareholders alone, the model is
very similar to the standard representative agent model, analyzed in e.g. Uhlig (2007). This
makes it easy to compare the outcomes of the general model with the representative agent
version, and to review the implications of the various model assumptions within a more
standard setup. More speci￿cally, we discuss the important implications of alternative spec-
i￿cations of the utility function for both the ￿nancial and the real decisions. We show that
it makes a major di⁄erence whether the utility function is assumed to be separable or non-
separable between consumption and labor. In order to clarify these implications we consider
three di⁄erent utility speci￿cations which are standard in the DSGE modelling work: the
separable power utility function, the King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) utility function and the
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988) utility function as examples of a non-separable
utility function.
Alternatively, when more than one type of household is present, the model encompasses
a variety of asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents. For instance, when both share-
holders and bondholders are present, our model is similar to that of Guvenen (2008). Al-
ternatively, when the economy consists of shareholders as well as workers, our setup is very
close to that of Danthine and Donaldson (2002). With all three agents present, our model
has the ￿ avor of agent heterogeneity as analyzed in Chien et al. (2007). In a three agent
framework, risk sharing considerations are more complicated, and we will show how some
of the mechanisms at work in a two agent models can work out di⁄erently in a broader
setting. We incorporate the labor decision for shareholders and bondholders in all versions
to maintain comparability over di⁄erent models. Excluding the labor choice for these agents
would make it easier to ￿t the asset pricing moments, as the labor choice o⁄ers shareholders
4another channel to smooth ￿ uctuations in marginal utility.
2.1 Households
There are three di⁄erent types of households in our model economy: shareholders, bondhold-
ers and workers. The types of households di⁄er in the way they insure against macroeconomic
risk and in the way they participate in the ￿nancial market. All agents maximize expected
utility, which depends positively on consumption and negatively on the amount of labor
supplied.
Type 1 Agents: Shareholders
Shareholders are freely able to invest both in stocks and bonds. They choose the amount of
working hours (N1;t) they supply at the prevailing spot market wage rate (W s
t ). The decision































In words, the shareholders￿budget constraint states that their expenditures on consump-
tion (C1;t), bonds (B1;t+1) and stocks (S1;t+1), cannot exceed total income. The aggregate
price level is denoted by Pt. Bonds are sold at a price P B
t , while shares trade at price P S
t . In
addition to labor income (W s
t N1;t), shareholders obtain funds from previous bond holdings
(B1;t), from stock holdings (S1;tP S
t ) and through dividend payments by the ￿rms (S1;tDt)
and the ￿nancial intermediary (￿t, see below). This maximization problem results in the
standard FOC (see Appendix A). In particular, they mimic the well known conditions for
consumption, labor and asset holdings in a standard representative agent model. The sto-
chastic discount factor of the shareholders is also used to price long term nominal and real
bonds.1
Type 2 Agents: Bondholders
Bondholders do not hold any shares in their portfolio. Bondholders also di⁄er from share-
holders in that their momentary utility function is characterized by a higher degree of risk
aversion, but they are otherwise very similar. In particular, the type 2 agents also work at























Bondholders engage in bond accumulation via a ￿nancial intermediary. In doing so, they
are subject to a portfolio cost ￿(B2;t+1). We introduce such a cost for bond holdings so that
the return on bonds will depend on the macro bond supply. The more bondholders save,
the lower the return. The more debt they accumulate, the higher the cost. This cost is
taken as given from the point of view of an individual bondholder. This mechanism is the
same as in Benigno (2007) who uses it in a two-country model. The introduction of such
an intermediation margin is necessary to avoid in￿nite bond holdings or borrowing. This
assumption has similar consequences as the discrete constraints on bond positions as imposed
in e.g. Guvenen (2008). The latter setup cannot be used when applying perturbation
methods to solve the model, as we do below. The intermediation pro￿ts made by the
￿nancial intermediary ￿t are rebated to the shareholders.
Type 3 Agents: Workers







The main di⁄erence from the other types of agents is that workers do not participate in
￿nancial markets at all and cannot accumulate wealth.2 As a result, these agents consume






This does not, however, mean that workers are completely unable to share their risk with
other agents in the economy. Rather to the contrary, similar to Danthine and Donaldson
(2002), we assume that workers engage in long-term labor contracts with the ￿rms.3 The
workers earn the contract wage (W c
t ) that corresponds to an optimal risk sharing arrangement
with the shareholders of the ￿rm, and in exchange they deliver the e¢ cient labor input to
2In fact, this feature follows endogenously from the fact that these agents are able to sign optimal risk
sharing contracts with the ￿rm owners. Given these contracts, workers will be indi⁄erent to participate in
the capital market or not. In order to get a well de￿ned solution, we need to make an additional assumption
on their ￿nancial behavior. But the results of the model are unlikely to be a⁄ected if we would take an
alternative assumption on this. In that sense, the model should not be in con￿ ict with the empirically
observed ￿nancial wealth that is held by these agents.
3We also considered an alternative setup, in which workers engage in one period contracts between
workers and ￿rms (See Boldrin and Horvath (1995) for more details). These contracts equalize the expected
marginal utility of both parties to their relative bargaining power. The implications for the labor supply are
very similar. To save space we do not report these results in the paper.

















The contract wage guarantees an optimal risk sharing between workers and shareholders
on a period-by-period basis for the given realization of the exogenous bargaining weight vt:
The steady state level of v is chosen such that the income distribution resulting from the
contract is similar to the outcome under spot labor markets. With a ￿xed value of v, the
contract provides optimal insurance against aggregate risk and reproduces the same outcome
as the exchange of contingent securities (constant relative marginal utilities), at given wealth
distribution. We will consider v as a time-varying process, driven by exogenous shocks to
the bargaining power. We will refer to these shocks as distribution risk where:
log(vt) = (1 ￿ ￿v)log(v) + ￿v log(vt￿1) + "
v
t
The e¢ cient contract wage has only distributive e⁄ects, and does not create any allocative
distortion. This means that workers will supply labor up to the point where their marginal
rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equal to the spot wage. We will refer
to the di⁄erence between the spot and the contract wage as the wage insurance premium.
Utility Function
In the benchmark version of the model, we use the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man
(1988, henceforth GHH) utility speci￿cation for all three agents:
GHH : Ui (Ci;t;Ni;t) =





We assume that ￿i, which we will refer to as the risk aversion with respect to con-
sumption, di⁄ers between shareholders and the two other types of agents. The agents that
participate freely in the ￿nancial market are assumed to be less risk averse. Our utility
function imposes the exact inverse relation between the risk aversion and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IRS): shareholders are assumed to be characterized by a higher
IRS. This assumption is in line with the empirical evidence on heterogeneity across di⁄erent
agents (e.g. Vissing-Jłrgensen (2002)).
In the comparison of the heterogeneous agent model with a representative agent model,
we also consider two alternative utility functions to illustrate the problem of standard models
to generate signi￿cant risk premiums and to explain how the choice of the utility function
in￿ uences our results. In these applications, the standard separable utility function and the
King, Plosser and Rebelo preferences (1988, henceforth KPR) are speci￿ed as:4
4Our choice for these utility functions is motivated by the following considerations. First, they allow us
to assess the e⁄ect of non-separability rigorously, as we will document below. Second, the KPR speci￿cation
is consistent with a balanced growth path, which is a desirable feature for future extensions of the model,










KPR : Ut =





The ￿nal consumption good is de￿ned as an aggregate basket over a continuum of di⁄er-



































































Nt (i) = N1;t (i) + N2;t (i) + N3;t (i)
Dividends are de￿ned as total sales income minus the wage bill (spot wage plus insurance
component), minus the price adjustment costs, minus investment expenditures, and plus the
net receipts from debt ￿nancing. Note that the insurance the ￿rms provide to the workers
and for taking the model to the data more rigorously. Third, one can interpret the GHH utility function
as one limit case of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2007, henceforth JR) preferences, with KPR utility being on










with 0 < ￿ < 1. The interpretation of GHH preferences as an extreme case of JR preferences, with ￿ ! 0;
responds to the critique that GHH preferences are inconsistent with a balanced growth path. It implies that
the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply is realized only very slowly over time, but in the long run this wealth
e⁄ect exactly o⁄sets the wage e⁄ect on labor supply. The cases we checked with JR utility, typically gave
intermediate results between KPR (￿ = 0) and GHH (￿ = 1), so we restrict our analysis to these two limit
cases.
8does not a⁄ect the allocation decisions of the ￿rm. Firms thus take a static labor demand
decision for the remaining labor inputs which are hired at the spot labor market, and an
intertemporal investment and price setting decision. In these optimization decisions, the
monopolistically competitive ￿rms face a demand schedule which is a negative function of
their relative price and a Cobb-Douglas production function that contains a ￿xed cost which
exactly o⁄sets the mark-up consistent with the assumption of free entry. Firms are assumed








and the adjustment cost for prices are speci￿ed as a function of the change in prices,









Firms are a⁄ected by standard productivity shocks Zt, where:
log(Zt) = (1 ￿ ￿z)log(Z) + ￿z log(Zt￿1) + "
z
t:
The innovations to the productivity process and the distribution process are allowed to
be correlated as discussed in the calibration below.
2.3 Equilibrium
Goods Market Clearing Condition:




2 + Y "
G
t (6)
When we add exogenous demand shocks "G
t to the model, these are assumed to follow an
autoregressive process that appears as a simple additive term in the goods market clearing
equation.
Bond Market Clearing Condition:
Given that there is no government debt in our model, the bond positions of bond and
shareholders must add up to the debt issued by the ￿rms:
B1;t + B2;t = Bf;t
All debt is in the form of one period discount bonds. Long term bonds are in zero net
supply, and the stochastic discount factor of the shareholders is used to price these bonds.
Equity Market Clearing Condition:
In equilibrium the shareholders will own the entire net present value of the ￿rm P s
t .
Therefore St, the share of the ￿rm that the shareholders own, must be equal to 1 in equilib-
rium.
S1t = St = 1 (7)
5We also investigated the impact of alternative investment adjustment costs but the result are not reported
here.
9Labor Market Clearing Condition:
N1;t + N2;t + N3;t = Nt
Monetary Policy:
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a simple in￿ ation targeting rule that contains some
inertia in the policy reaction:










where we impose that the real rate R is in line with the equilibrium rate determined
in the rest of the economy.6 In one application, we will also allow for an autoregressive
monetary policy shock.
2.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated using the parameter values in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration of the Parameters
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿P " ￿0
B ￿ ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿ rz r￿ ￿
0.99 0.02 0.30 0.5 5 5 5x10￿5 0.3 4 10 10 1.75 3.0 0.90 0.0075
The discount factor (￿) is set at 0.99. The depreciation rate (￿) is 2% per quarter. The
capital adjustment costs are a function of the change in the capital stock with an elasticity
(￿) set at 0.50. The distribution parameter in the Cobb-Douglas production function (￿) is
equal to (0.30). The values for these parameters are standard in the literature. The price
adjustment costs (￿P) are set at 5, which corresponds with a relatively small adjustment cost
and therefore a high coe¢ cient of the marginal cost in the linearized Phillips curve which is
purely forward looking. This adjustment cost is chosen to generate a realistic volatility for
in￿ ation in the model. The elasticity of substitution in the demand aggregator is assumed
to be 5, so that the mark-up is 25%. Under the assumption of zero excess pro￿ts, this
implies a ￿xed cost in the production function which amounts to 25% of output as well.
The ￿nancial intermediation costs that bondholders face are a linear function of their bond
holdings with a small sensitivity of 0.00005. This guarantees that the e⁄ective interest rate
that bondholders face will never deviate more than 12.5% from the market interest rate in
the benchmark model. This parameter also generates a realistic wealth distribution in the
benchmark model. Firm debt is assumed to be 30% of the capital stock.
More important for our application are the functional form and the parameters of the
utility function. Under the benchmark speci￿cation with GHH preferences, we assume a risk
aversion with respect to consumption (￿) of 10 for the workers and the bondholders, and 4
for the shareholders. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is assumed
6In a stochastic setting, this rate will adjust to the risk premium present in the equilibrium real short
rate.
10to be equal to 1.5 for all agents (￿ = 1:75), and   is chosen so that hours worked for all
agents is the same and scaled at 1.
The monetary policy rule in the benchmark model is characterized by a strong in￿ ation
reaction (r￿ = 3) and a relatively high degree of inertia (r￿ =0.9). These parameters are
chosen to obtain a reasonable match for the volatility of the short real rate and in￿ ation in
the benchmark model. The steady state in￿ ation rate (￿) is equal to 0.75% on a quarterly
basis corresponding with the average historical in￿ ation rate.
The shares of the population are ￿xed so that workers make up 60%, bondholders 30% and
shareholders 10% of the total population. The fraction of the workers should re￿ ect the share
of the population which is engaged in a labor contract with the ￿rms. The remaining 40%
can be thought of as the self-employed or entrepreneurs who do not bene￿t from a standard
labor contract, but earn a spot wage that re￿ ects their marginal productivity (corrected for
the marginal cost).
We estimate the stochastic processes for productivity and distribution risk based on US
data over the period 1947-2007. The parameters characterizing these shock processes are
given in Table 2. The autocorrelation in the TFP process is estimated at 0.97 with a standard
deviation for the Solow residual of 0.75%. The exogenous process (vt) which determines the
bargaining power of workers and ￿rms in the contract wage, is also estimated based on the
optimal contract condition (Equation (1)). In the estimation of this shock, we evaluate the
marginal utilities of both parties in the contract by approximating the consumption of the
workers by the total wage bill and the consumption of the shareholders by GDP minus the
wage bill and investment. Both agents are assumed to work the same numbers of hours. The
resulting process for the distribution shock has an autocorrelation of 0.92 with a st.dev. of
0.20. The innovation in TFP and the distribution process have a negative correlation of -0.5.
We refer to this correlation as the distributive e⁄ect of the productivity shock, which is not
captured by the endogenous dynamics of the model (see Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis
(2008) for a discussion of the distributive consequences of TFP shocks).
Table 2: Calibration of the Stochastic Structure
￿z ￿z ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿z;￿ ￿g ￿g ￿m ￿m
0.0075 0.97 0.20 0.92 -0.50 0.006 0.95 0.15 0.5
When we use the historical realizations for these two exogenous processes in the simula-
tion of the model (see section 5), we are able to explain 0.85% of the growth rate in GDP
and 0.93% of the change in the wage share. So, with this stochastic structure, we capture a
large fraction of the observed macroeconomic volatility. The volatility of both innovations
displays a remarkable decline over time and in particular around 1984. For the pre- and post
1984 subsamples, we observe a 50% decline in the st.dev. of the Solow residual (from 0.88
to 0.44) and 20% decline in the distribution shock (from 0.22 to 0.18).
The benchmark model that is presented below, contains only these two sources of shocks.
In one experiment, we also consider two additional demand shocks: a public spending shock
that a⁄ects the aggregate demand equation (with autocorrelation 0.95 and standard error
of 0.6% expressed as a percentage of GDP) and an interest rate shock (with autocorrelation
0.5 and a st.error of 0.15 which corresponds to 60 basis points in the annual rate).
113 Dynamic Properties of the Model
First, we discuss the overall statistics of the model both for the real, the nominal and the
￿nancial side of the economy and we compare these results to the data statistics. We focus
on the model with two types of shocks or risks in the economy: aggregate productivity shocks
and distribution shocks. In order to illustrate the contribution of the heterogeneous agent
assumption, we compare the results with the outcomes of a representative agent model, in
which only type 1 agents are present. In this way, we show how the heterogeneous agent
structure helps to overcome the shortcomings of the representative agent model. Second, we
illustrate the dynamics of the model by discussing the transmission mechanism of the shocks
through the economy in more detail. Third, we document the important role of the utility
function that is retained in our model. Fourth, we turn to the analysis of the risk sharing
arrangements in the model. We discuss successively the risk sharing between bondholders
and shareholders (similar to the set up retained in Guvenen (2008)) and the risk sharing
between workers and shareholders (similar to the setup retained in Danthine and Donaldson
(2002)). We analyze the relative importance of both types of risk sharing in the model by
looking at the impact on the shareholder budget constraint over the cycle. Finally, we discuss
the speci￿c role of distribution risk and add demand shocks to make the stochastic structure
more complete.
3.1 Overall Statistics of the Model
Table 3 and 4 summarize the overall statistics of the model. We compare these results with
a representative agent version in which only shareholders (type 1 agents) are present in the
economy but all other parameters remain the same (the distribution risk is not active in
that economy and risk aversion is kept at 4). We should not expect the model to ￿t the
data moments exactly: in reality more shocks are present and additional nominal and real
frictions will a⁄ect the transmission of the shocks. So the objective is not to ￿t the data in
all dimensions, but rather to illustrate that the model with heterogeneous agents improves
signi￿cantly on the representative agent case in the desired direction compared to the data.
The results in Table 3 and 4 are based on the unconditional moments of a second order
approximation of the model.7
The benchmark model with three types of heterogeneous agents ￿ts the data well both
in terms of ￿nancial and real variables. The model is able to generate an important risk
premium both for equity (EP = 4.77) and for the holding period return on a 10-year bond
(BP =1.99). For the bond, this excess holding period return corresponds with a yield
spread (y ￿ Rn) of 1.56. The model generates a risk free real rate (Rf) of 1.20% with a
standard deviation of 3.50. The volatility of the return to equity is 20.18, which yields
a Sharpe ratio (SR) of 0.24. These statistics are close to the observed post-war average.
We slightly underestimate the equity risk premium and the SR. However, as mentioned
before, this analysis considers only two sources of risk (for instance, the risk premium on
equity increases to 5.61 if we also consider demand shocks). Moreover, as we discuss later
7We cross-checked the consistency of these results with the statistics based on a second order approx-
imation using the moments of a ￿rst order approximate solution of the model and assuming lognormally
distributed variables as in Uhlig (2007).
12Table 3: Financial Statistics
SR EP BP yf￿Rn Rf ￿Rf ￿RS ￿￿
Benchmark Model 0.24 4.77 1.99 1.56 1.20 3.50 20.18 3.00
Data
1947-2007 0.39 6.11 - 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 2.62
1926-2007 0.26 5.85 - - 0.60 5.27 22.35 5.28
Representative agent
SEP 0.03 0.09 0.04 -0.03 4.00 0.62 3.22 0.52
KPR 0.07 0.53 0.24 0.11 3.80 1.32 7.68 1.20
GHH 0.14 1.90 0.74 0.52 3.09 2.10 13.90 1.60
Heterogeneous agents
productivity only 0.21 3.44 1.38 1.10 1.93 2.62 16.81 1.88
distribution only 0.06 0.31 0.14 0.04 3.89 1.48 5.59 1.60
demand extra 0.26 5.61 2.52 1.96 0.58 4.20 21.59 4.40
T1+T2 0.19 3.11 1.29 1.01 2.18 2.62 17.80 1.88
T1+T3 0.26 5.74 2.42 1.88 0.68 4.06 36.2 3.68
Note: For the period 1926:1-1998:4 we use the dataset of Campbell (2003). For the period 1999:1-
2007:4 we use the United States MSCI from Datastream to calculate the equity statistics. To
calculate the bond statistics we use the FED Funds rate and the ten year bond from the BIS.
The standard deviation of the annualized interest and in￿ ation rate is computed as 400 times the
quarterly model concept. The standard deviation of the equity return is computed as that of a
compounded annual return. The standard deviation of the annualized equity return is 200 times the
quarterly model concept.
on, there has been a great moderation in the volatilities of the underlying shocks, and it is
not unlikely that one might underestimate the average risk premium by working with the
average standard deviation of the shocks.
In terms of the real statistics, the model generates an aggregate output volatility that is
slightly higher than observed in the data (1.86% against 1.70%). On the other hand, hours
worked is less volatile compared to the data (0.82 versus 1.34), but the model reproduces
the high correlation between total hours and output. The consumption volatility is too
high (1.59 versus 1.17), while investment is not su¢ ciently volatile (3.31 versus 4.94). Both
demand components also display an excessive correlation with output. These results indicate
a signi￿cant shortcoming of the model. Decreasing the capital adjustment costs does not
substantially improve these statistics because it would strongly reduce the risk premiums in
the model. Another explanation is the very persistent nature of the two exogenous shocks
that we consider. Lowering the persistence of these shocks improves the relative volatility
and lowers the correlation with output, but this goes along with a cost in terms of the risk
premium. Results might improve if we would allow for more, less persistent sources of risk
in the model. For instance, the introduction of investment-speci￿c technology shocks, which
is suggested in some recent papers as an alternative important source of volatility, could
increase the volatility of investment and reduce the variation and the procyclical nature of
consumption. Real wages in the model are somewhat smoother than in the data (0.63 versus
0.78). While the correlation with output is moderate, it still overpredicts the wage-output
correlation in the data (0.55 versus 0.09). The wage share is relatively volatile, countercyclical
13Table 4: Macroeconomic Statistics
￿Y ￿I ￿I;Y ￿C ￿C;Y ￿N ￿N;Y ￿W ￿W;Y ￿WN=Y ￿WN=Y;Y
Benchmark Model 1.86 3.31 0.93 1.59 0.98 0.82 0.94 0.63 0.55 2.37 -0.28
Data
1947-2007 1.70 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
Representative agent
SEP 0.48 0.60 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.84 -0.99 1.15 1.00 0.31 -0.50
KPR 1.13 1.37 1.00 1.07 1.00 0.13 -0.80 0.91 0.99 0.66 -0.43
GHH 1.92 2.25 1.00 1.84 1.00 0.82 0.99 0.61 0.99 1.39 -0.32
Heterogeneous agents
Productivity only 1.90 2.66 1.00 1.72 1.00 0.81 0.98 0.58 1.00 1.92 -0.25
Distribution only 0.27 1.07 -0.50 0.52 0.89 0.28 0.99 0.63 0.71 0.86 0.40
Demand extra 1.93 3.77 0.78 1.71 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.66 0.54 2.37 -0.27
T1+T2 1.90 2.66 1.00 1.72 1.00 0.81 0.98 0.60 0.98 1.66 -0.27
T1+T3 1.86 3.70 0.86 1.59 0.93 0.86 0.91 0.74 0.41 2.68 -0.27
Note: The data come from the FRED database at the St-louis Fed and the BLS. All real variables have been
detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter except for the wage share. The output correlation of the wage share is
the correlation between HP-￿ltered output and the un￿ltered wage share.
and close to the behavior in the data. We consider this last result as a very important and
positive feature of the benchmark model, since the income distribution plays a crucial role
for the volatility of the capital returns and therefore also for the pricing of the underlying
assets. Note also that the model does a reasonable job in ￿tting the volatility of in￿ ation in
the data.
The benchmark model endogenously generates the following wealth distribution: 85.5%
of ￿nancial assets are held by the top 10% of the population that consists of shareholders,
14.5% of ￿nancial wealth is held by the next 20% of the population that is represented
by the bondholders, and 0% of the wealth is held by the workers. The shareholdings are
-by de￿nition- concentrated in the ￿rst group. This distribution implies a concentration of
wealth and stock market participation that is very similar to the one typically measured in
the US wealth distribution (see e.g. Wol⁄, 2006).8
The representative agent (RA) model is not able to ￿t the data as well both on the
￿nancial and the real side. However, our results also illustrate that the results of the repre-
sentative agent case depend strongly on the speci￿cation of the utility function. The failure
of the RA model to explain the observed risk premiums in a model with endogenous capital
and labor decisions, as documented widely in the literature (see, e.g., Jermann (1998), Lettau
and Uhlig (2000), Boldrin et al. (2001), Uhlig (2007), ...), is most obvious if we look at the
more standard setup of a separable utility function (separable in consumption and labor).
With this utility function and a risk aversion of 4, the labor supply is used intensively to
smooth the consumption stream. The endogenous labor decision implies that labor supply
is strongly countercyclical so that the overall volatility in the economy is reduced. With a
8Over the last two decades, there has been an increasing share of the population that participates in the
stock market. An interesting extension of the paper would be to analyze the implications of this increase in
stock market participation for the risk premium.
14smooth consumption stream and a fairly low volatility in the return to capital, there is no
longer a reason to require high risk premiums.
A non-separable utility function goes a long way to overcome this problem even in a
representative agent context. This is especially the case with GHH preferences, where the
labor supply condition is no longer a⁄ected by an income/wealth e⁄ect. In that model,
too, the volatility of the return to capital increases considerably. This is mainly due to the
assumption of monopolistic competition and sticky prices, which makes the mark-ups highly
time-varying and the implied pro￿ts highly procyclical, at least in a model that is driven
by supply shocks. In addition, the presence of ￿xed costs, which are calibrated to o⁄set
the mark-up in steady state, increases the operational leverage of the ￿rms and increases
the volatility of the return to capital. This result is also illustrated by the countercyclical
behavior of the wage share implied by this model. However, compared to the benchmark
model, the RA-GHH model yields a higher stochastic real rate and less volatility in the
return on stocks. If we allow for a higher risk aversion for the representative agent, the
results for the ￿nancial statistics improve, but problems remain in terms of explaining the
a-cyclical nature of wages and the countercyclicality of the wage share.
3.2 Impulse Response Function of the Shocks
In order to demonstrate the transmission mechanisms of the model, Figure 1 reports the
impulse response functions (IRF) for the benchmark three-agent model and the RA model
with three types of utility functions. The graph concentrates on aggregate variables, except
for the marginal utility which refers to the shareholders in case of the heterogeneous agent
model.
First of all, the benchmark model produces a fairly strong propagation of the produc-
tivity shock (which has a standard error of 0.75) on total output. The relative response of
investment is signi￿cantly stronger than the impact on consumption. Consumption reacts
modestly in the short run and the reaction displays a hump-shaped pro￿le. This behavior is
related to the very modest reaction in the real wage in the short run. As a consequence the
wage share drops strongly on impact.9 The assumed correlation between the productivity
and the distribution shock enhances this drop in the wage share, as the bargaining power of
workers declines following a positive productivity shock. The large drop in the wage share
explains why in￿ ation declines relatively strongly. The price adjustment costs imply that the
mark-up goes up signi￿cantly in the short run. All this implies a very volatile and procyclical
behavior of pro￿ts. With standard price adjustment costs, in￿ ation is purely forward looking
and jumps on impact. Monetary policy accommodates the productivity shock by lowering
the short rate. The policy rule generates a gradual but persistent reaction of the short rate.
In terms of asset prices, we observe a strong increase in equity and bond prices. This
strong reaction is driven by the large variations in the marginal utility of the investors on the
one hand, and the high volatility in pro￿ts and the implied dividend stream, on the other
hand.
9This type of behavior of the wage share has also been illustrated in the data by Rios-Rull and
Santaeulalia-Llopis (2008), although we do not observe the sign reversal in the wage share that was pointed
out in that paper.
15Figure 1: Impulse Response to a (one std. err.) Productivity Shock
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Note: The bold line is the response of the benchmark model. The line with diamonds is the representative
agent model with GHH preferences. The crossed line is the representative agent model with KPR preferences.
The line with circles is the representative agent model with a separable utility function.
The results for the representative agent models depend strongly on the speci￿cation of
the utility function. With a separable utility function, we obtain the standard results of the
literature: labor supply is used to smooth consumption and reduces the risk premium. This
happens at the cost of reducing the overall volatility in the economy. The productivity shocks
are completely o⁄set by adjustments in the labor supply through the wealth e⁄ects: with
a high productivity, labor supply is decreased through a strong wealth e⁄ect. By working
less, agents try to smooth the e⁄ect on consumption. The non-separable utility functions are
a⁄ected a lot less by this wealth e⁄ect, and under GHH preferences, the reaction of aggregate
hours worked and aggregate consumption is very similar to the reaction in the benchmark
model. Note, however, that the marginal utility of the shareholders in the benchmark model
is more volatile than in the RA model.
The labor share is also countercyclical in the representative agent model because of the
time-varying mark-up and the presence of ￿xed costs which both help to generate counter-
cyclical wage shares. In booms the mark-up will be higher and the excess pro￿ts lower the
16wage share in total output, whereas the ￿xed costs also reduce the wage share as output
goes up. However, the representative agent models with spot labor markets are not able to
generate the same countercyclical wage shares as we observe in the benchmark heterogeneous
model with labor contracts. Higher volatility in marginal utility and capital income explain
the stronger reaction of asset prices in the heterogeneous agent model.
3.3 Role of the Utility Function
The role of the utility function deserves some detailed discussion because it is crucial for the
joint dynamics of the real and the ￿nancial decisions in the model. Its importance derives
from the fact that marginal utility enters both in the stochastic discount factor for asset
pricing and in the labor supply decision. To focus ideas, let us start from the case of a
representative agent with a CRRA utility function and separability between consumption
and labor.10 The equity premium (EP A
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The price of risk depends on the volatility of consumption growth, on the correlation
between consumption and the return on capital, and on the degree of risk aversion.
The agent also has the opportunity to adjust her labor supply to smooth ￿ uctuations in
marginal utility. The linearized ￿rst order condition relates the supply of labor to real wages
and consumption:
(￿ ￿ 1)^ nt = ^ wt ￿ ￿^ ct
Following a positive productivity shock, the increase in consumption, ceteris paribus, lowers
the marginal utility of the real wage, which reduces labor supply. The reduction in working
hours, in turn, mitigates the initial expansionary e⁄ects of the productivity shock. As a
result, the rise in both marginal productivity (and thus the stock return rs) and consump-
tion (and thus volatility of marginal utility ￿￿￿) will be smaller. Increasing the degree of
risk aversion, which can contribute to the risk premium in a model with exogenous labor,
will induce a more intensive utilization of the labor supply to smooth consumption.11 The
analytical expressions above reveal that there is no hope of improving asset pricing implica-
tions by allowing for endogenous labor in a separable utility framework. Moreover, in terms
10There are an enormous amount of variations on this basic representative agent framework, and our goal
is not to provide a detailed overview (see e.g. Kocherlakota 1996). Rather, we here focus on the role of
introducing the labor decision.
11Even in a model with exogenous labor, a higher degree of risk aversion is not an option for solving the
equity premium puzzle as it generates the so-called risk free rate puzzle.
17of macro implications, these results do not yield the observed positive correlation between
labor inputs and output.
The introduction of non-separability between labor and consumption in the utility func-
tion strongly a⁄ects the model￿ s macro and ￿nancial responses. The corresponding Sharpe
ratio becomes (see e.g. Uhlig (2007) and Appendix B):
SRt = ￿rs;￿c￿cc￿￿c ￿ ￿rs;￿n￿cn;n￿￿n (8)
where ￿cc = ￿UCC￿C
UC is the relative risk aversion with respect to consumption. The
cross-derivative term ￿cn;n measures the degree of non-separability in the utility function:
￿cn;n = UCN￿N
UC > 0 (complements) < 0 (substitutes):
The ￿rst term in (8) implies that the price of risk increases with the correlation between
consumption and stock returns, the risk aversion, and the volatility of consumption growth.
This is the traditional mechanism also at work in the representative agent model with exoge-
nous labor and separable utility. Non-separability leads to an additional e⁄ect depending on
the volatility of labor supply, the cross-derivative of marginal utility with respect to hours
worked, and the correlation between hours worked and the return on equity. The sign of this
term depends on the cross-derivative and the correlation.
On the macro side, the linearized FOC for labor supply can be written as:
(￿cc + ￿nc;c)b ct ￿ (￿nn + ￿cn;n)^ nt = b wt (9)
Equation (9) shows that the strength of the income and substitution e⁄ects on labor
supply are also controlled by the cross-derivatives of the utility function to its respective
arguments. This means that introducing non-separabilities in utility does not just buy
some free parameters to scale up asset pricing moments, such as the Sharpe ratio. By
contrast, we impose discipline on the exercise by examining a selection of both ￿nancial and
macroeconomic moments. To aid intuition, Table 5 below summarizes the implied elasticities
for each of the three preference speci￿cations.
Table 5: Implied Elasticities for Utility Functions
SEP KPR GHH
￿cc ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿1
￿cn;n 0 (￿ ￿ 1) ￿
￿
￿￿1
￿cc+￿nc;c ￿ 1 0
￿nn+￿cn;n ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
Note: This table assumes C = W
P N. SEP stands
for separable utility function. KPR stands for
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) utility function.
GHH stands for Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄-
man (1988) utility function.
The analytical expressions in the ￿rst two rows of the table help to evaluate the Sharpe
ratio, while the lower two rows are crucial to determine the labor supply reaction. The
18cross-derivative terms a⁄ect both the SR in Equation (8) and the labor supply decision
in Equation (9). Under KPR and GHH utility, consumption and labor are complements
(see Table 5: ￿cn;n = (￿ ￿ 1) > 0 under KPR and ￿cn;n = ￿
￿
￿￿1 > 0 under GHH). In
other words, agents will prefer positive comovement between consumption and labor, and
the negative consumption/wealth e⁄ect on labor supply (￿cc + ￿nc;c) is reduced to 1 under
KPR preferences, while the e⁄ect drops to zero under GHH preferences. However, if hours
worked become procyclical, so that the correlation ￿rs;￿n is positive, and the cross-derivative
is positive, then the second term in the SR in Equation (8) has a negative e⁄ect on the price
of risk. Hence, during a recession -when marginal utility is high due to low consumption-
the reduction in hours worked will mitigate or even o⁄set this increase in marginal utility.
In sum, non-separability can help by alleviating the strong income e⁄ects at work in the
￿rst order condition for labor supply under separable utility. This will reduce the strong
countercyclical nature of employment, which reinforces the propagation of the productivity
shock. However, because labor and consumption are complements, their comovement will
also tend to stabilize marginal utility. This, in turn, limits the model￿ s ability to generate
signi￿cant risk premiums. Given that GHH preferences overcome -at least to some extent-
the important problems of the separable utility function, we retain these preferences for
all our versions of the heterogeneous agents model that we consider in this paper (see also
Guvenen (2008)).
3.4 Role of the Risk Sharing Arrangements
In a model with heterogeneous agents and a complete market of contingent claims, one












where ￿ depends on the relative wealth of the two agents. In our setup, there are no
contingent claims and we also assume that type 2 and type 3 agents have no access to the
stock market. We consider two alternative risk sharing arrangements in this paper: the bond
market and the labor contract.
The Bond Market
Type 2 agents￿only recourse to smooth their marginal utility is the bond market. By selling
and buying bonds to/from the shareholders, these two types of agents will try to achieve
the equalization of their relative marginal utilities over time.12 However, the bond market
provides only an imperfect risk sharing device for the bondholders as they are confronted with
an e⁄ective interest rate that will deviate from the market rate: the ￿nancial intermediation
margin depends on their net wealth position and imposes the intertemporal consumption
constraint on their consumption decision.
12Firms debt ￿nancing is assumed to be a constant fraction of the capital stock and this supply of bonds
will determine the portfolio of the active shareholders. In a ￿rst order approximation of the model, bonds
and equity are perfect substitutes and we do not need to consider the impact of this decision.
19Figure 2 summarizes the consumption/savings decision of the bondholders in case of a
positive productivity shock. This ￿gure complements the evidence on the aggregate dynamics
presented in Figure 1 with the evidence on the consumption and income responses for the
di⁄erent agents in the economy. As in Figure 1, the IR functions are based on a ￿rst order
approximation of the model around a steady state in which the bondholders have zero net
bond holdings. Higher current and expected labor income increases their wealth and drives
up their consumption. In the model, the short run increase in real wage income is moderate
as ￿rms will lower their prices only gradually and the expansion of production is limited on
impact as well. On the other hand, bondholders want to increase consumption more quickly
in order to smooth the expected marginal utility. As a result, they will start to borrow in the
bond market to ￿nance consumption. Shareholders, who are the counterpart of this bond
trade, experience a much stronger increase in their income as they bene￿t from the increased
mark-up and other mechanisms in the model that generate a strongly procyclical pro￿t share.
Even after ￿nancing investment plans, ￿rms have su¢ cient resources which they transfer to
the shareholders in the form of higher dividend payments. Therefore, shareholders will be
eager to provide the necessary funds to the bondholders, and the real interest rate, which
clears the bond market, will decrease. The increase in the intermediation margin, which
remains very small in magnitude, will prevent complete risk sharing. Note that this result is
obtained despite the di⁄erence in the IRS of the two parties, which reinforces the smoothing
motive of the bondholders relative to the shareholders.
From this discussion, it follows that the risk sharing through the bond market between
type 1 and type 2 agents, allows the shareholders to smooth their consumption, which will
tend to reduce the risk premium relative to an economy in which these agents are not
allowed to trade in the bond market. This conclusion is opposite to the results obtained by
Guvenen (2008). In that paper, the bond trade is mainly driven by the precautionary savings
motive which is based on the countercyclical e⁄ective risk aversion of bondholders and which
provides these agents with an additional motive to smooth their consumption volatility over
the cycle. So in the model of Guvenen, bondholders will save after a positive productivity
shock and this increases the consumption volatility of the shareholders. Our ￿rst order e⁄ect
on the bond trade clearly dominates the precautionary savings motive which is central in
the model of Guvenen.13 The precautionary savings motive determines the positive bond
position of the bondholders in the stochastic steady state which is important to evaluate
the implications of the model for the wealth distribution in the economy. In the paper of
Guvenen, the ￿rst order redistributive e⁄ects of a productivity shock are absent as the wage
share is constant over the business cycle.
This conclusion about the role of bond trade for risk sharing does not imply that a model
populated solely with T1 and T2 agents is unable to generate a signi￿cant risk premium.
The outcomes of such a model are documented in Table 3 and 4. Compared to the RA model
(both with GHH preferences), we see that the real macro variables remain very much the
same, except for aggregate consumption, which becomes slightly more cyclical. Behind this
aggregate consumption behavior, there is a more volatile consumption of shareholders and a
smoother behavior for the more risk averse (or lower IRS) bondholders. Therefore, this model
13We will discuss the relative contribution of this mechanism later on, when we discuss the time-varying
nature of the risk premium in a third order approximation of the model.
20Figure 2: Consumption Dynamics for the Three Agents (one std. err. Productivity Shock)
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Note: The impact of the insurance scheme, the bond trade and the mark-up are calculated, ceteris paribus,
by adding (or subtracting depending on the agents) to consumption the size of the premium, savings and
mark-up respectively, while keeping all other variables ￿xed as observed in the benchmark model.
still increases the risk premium because the shareholders bear most of the aggregate risk as
they earn all the pro￿ts, and their income share is therefore highly procyclical. The bond
trade provides only an imperfect risk sharing device and prevents an optimal distribution of
risk as assumed in the RA model.
The Labor Contract
Type 3 agents have no access to the ￿nancial market, but they will design an optimal
labor contract which allows for risk sharing.14 If we assume that the worker-￿rm relation
is a permanent relation, these contracts exactly reproduce the optimality condition for risk
sharing (10) expressed above. The shareholders guarantee a consumption level to the workers
that implies a constant relative marginal utility. The ratio between the two marginal utilities
(￿) re￿ ects the bargaining power of the two parties in the contract arrangement. In our
steady state, we assume that the optimal contract will imply a wage and consumption level
14See Gomme and Greenwood (1995) and Boldrin and Horvath (1995) for a detailed discussion of a labor
contracts between workers and entrepreneurs in an RBC model.
21for the workers that is equivalent to the steady state outcome under the spot labor market.15
This setup is also considered in Danthine and Donaldson (2002), who assume, however, that
labor supply is exogenous.16
Relative to the outcome under a spot labor market, the contract wage contains an in-
surance premium through which workers exchange the risk with the marginal shareholder
of the ￿rms. Given the high risk aversion (or low IRS) of the workers, the contract wage
guarantees them a smooth consumption stream. In exchange for the insurance provided by
the ￿rm, workers o⁄er the required labor services to the ￿rm. This optimal contract wage
plays only a distributive role, and does not a⁄ect the allocation decision of the ￿rms or the
workers. The contract implies an e¢ cient utilization of the labor supply which equalizes
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption of the worker to the spot
wage, and the marginal product of labor (if there would be no mark-ups in the economy).
The result is a countercyclical labor share and more volatile and highly procyclical pro￿ts.
Figure 2 shows the impact of the insurance premium on the workers￿and shareholders￿
consumption for a positive productivity shock. The contract wage will increase less than
the spot wage, meaning that the insurance premium received by the workers is negative
which helps to stabilize their consumption. The contribution of the premium is relatively
small on impact but increases in the periods following the shock. To further illustrate
all the mechanisms at work, Figure 2 also contains the impact of the mark-up variation
on the consumption streams. With sticky prices, the mark-up increases considerably on
impact and drives a large wedge between the spot wage and the marginal productivity of
labor. Therefore, the spot wage and the corresponding consumption of the workers would be
substantially more volatile in a version with ￿ exible prices, ￿xed mark-ups and no insurance
mechanism. The opposite holds of course for the shareholders, who receive the short run
excess pro￿ts, and so their consumption volatility would be much less outspoken under
￿ exible prices. These redistributive e⁄ects of price stickiness dominate the contribution of
the contract wage in the short run but the impact dies out relatively quickly as ￿rms adjust
their prices and mark-ups are restored at the equilibrium level.
Figure 2 (line with diamonds) also illustrates the contribution of the imposed correlation
between productivity and distribution risk on the consumption dynamics. Recall that this
correlation reinforces the decline in the wage share following the positive productivity shock,
in line with the observed evidence in the data. It is obvious that shareholder consumption
would have been less volatile in the absence of this additional distributive e⁄ect.17
15We could also assume that workers have some extra bargaining power, which would result in a consump-
tion level above the spot market outcome. This would imply a lower level of dividends and consumption for
the shareholders and at the same time a higher volatility in their dividends/consumption stream (implying
a higher risk premium).
16An alternative assumption to the permanent relations is that the worker-￿rm relation takes the form of
one-period contract: this contract will guarantee an expected relative marginal utility level to the workers.
If workers have no bargaining outcome, then this expected relative utility will be equal to the expected
outcome in the spot market. Again, if workers have some bargaining power the wage will guarantee some
extra relative to the market outcome. This contract setup is similar to the one considered in Boldrin and
Horvath (1995).
17One additional issue in this context is the choice of the bargaining weight (￿) in the contract. If we
assume that workers have some bargaining power, and are able to negotiate a wage that is above the outcome
in the spot market, then the average pro￿t rate in the economy is lowered so that the volatility of pro￿ts,
22In sum, the contract wage, the costly price adjustment and the redistributive e⁄ects of a
productivity shock all contribute to smoothing workers￿labor income and consumption. In
doing so, they also exacerbate the cyclical reaction of shareholders￿consumption. Therefore,
these three mechanisms help to increase the risk premium in the model.
In Table 3 and 4, we also show the outcomes for a model that contains only type 1
and type 3 agents, which make up respectively 10% and 90% of the population. From
the above discussion, it becomes clear why such a model generates a larger risk premium
than in the model with three types of agents. By excluding the bondholders and closing
the bond market trade, shareholders are no longer able to share their excess aggregate and
distributive risk with the bondholders. Therefore, this risk will be more concentrated at the
relatively small group of shareholders, who will require a high premium in exchange. The
high premium re￿ ects both the high volatility in the return to capital and the high volatility
in the marginal utility of the marginal investor, and both determinants of the premium will
be highly correlated: the high premium goes together with a high price of risk as re￿ ected
in the SR.
Risk Sharing and the Volatility of Shareholders￿Consumption
The relative contribution of the bond market and the labor contract in the total amount of
risk sharing can be illustrated by decomposing the variance of the shareholders consumption
(see Guvenen for a similar decomposition) into three determinants: income from labor and
capital (interest and dividend income excluding the wage insurance premium), the dividend
income derived from the wage contract arrangement and the bond trade with the bondhold-
ers.
C1 = Other Capital and Labor Revenue(OR) + Insurance(Ins) + Bondsavings(Bs)
Table 6 summarizes the contribution of the risk sharing arrangements on the volatility of
shareholder consumption growth. The variation in income from capital and labor is clearly
the dominant source of the consumption volatility of the shareholders, and its variance
exceeds even the variance of consumption changes (the relative variance is 109.3%). The
premium related to the labor contract reinforces the variability by 29.4% and its contribution
is slightly positively correlated to the other income resources. The variability in the bond
trade is small in absolute magnitude as the variance of these ￿ ows makes up only 6.4% of
the consumption variance, though this contribution is strongly negatively correlated with
the two other sources of income (apparent from covariance terms). In total, the bond trade
allows shareholders to smooth their consumption variance by 41.8%.
Overall this table might give the impression that the heterogeneous agents framework, and
in particular the additional risk sharing arrangements that we consider, tends to moderate
the overall risk for the shareholders. This conclusion is misleading, however: the results
only indicate that the shareholders￿consumption volatility is lower in the benchmark model
relative to a situation in which there is no bond trade at all and bondholders are completely
liquidity constrained.
It is clear that the relative risk aversion of the agents plays a crucial role for both risk
sharing devices. If the risk aversion of all agents is equal, then the risk sharing through the
that results from the risk sharing, increases.







2 ￿ covar(￿OR;￿Ins) 3.2%
2 ￿ covar(￿OR;￿Bs) -33.8%
2 ￿ covar(￿Ins;￿Bs) -14.3%
bond/fund market or through the labor market will reproduce an outcome similar to that
of the representative agent economy. Small di⁄erences may arise from wealth distribution
e⁄ects, in particular on labor supplies, and from ￿nancial costs. With a higher risk aversion
(lower IRS) for type 2 and type 3 agents relative to the type 1 agents, their desire to smooth
consumption increases and as a consequence available funds for the shareholders￿consump-
tion will tend to become more volatile and procyclical. The di⁄erences in risk aversion
increase both the Sharpe ratio and the required risk premium on stocks. Our assumption on
the relative risk aversion is con￿rmed in the data. For instance, Vissing-Jłrgensen (2002)
provides evidence of lower elasticities of intertemporal substitution (or higher risk aversion)
for non-shareholders. This risk aversion cannot be estimated directly from the ￿rst order
condition for stocks as these agents do not participate in that market. Wachter and Yogo
(2007) propose a justi￿cation for the negative relation between risk aversion and wealth
based on a non-homothetic function of two types of consumption goods (basic and luxury
goods) and show how such a model also explains the observed positive relation between the
share of risky assets in the portfolio and wealth.
3.5 Distribution Risk and Demand Shocks
The benchmark model contains both productivity and distribution risk and these two types
of shocks are correlated as was discussed in the calibration section. In the previous discussion,
we focused our presentation on the role of the productivity shock. Distribution risk further
increases the risk premium and is also helpful to better match the variability in the wage
share and the moderate cyclicality of wages. The heterogeneous agent model o⁄ers the
natural context for introducing this type of uncertainty. Tables 3 and 4 also document the
speci￿c contribution of each of the two shocks when considered as two independent shocks.
The stochastic process (￿v= 0.20 and ￿v= 0.92) that was estimated for the distribution
shock generates a moderate volatility in the real wage and the wage share (st.dev. of 0.63 and
0.86 in the HP-￿ltered series). Recall that distribution shocks only change the distribution
of output between workers and ￿rms, but do not cause any misallocation of labor: workers
still try to equalize the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor to
the spot wage. Output and employment are therefore only in￿ uenced through the induced
variation in aggregate demand and these e⁄ects are very moderate. Shareholders are able
24to smooth consumption by adjusting investment expenditures and their bond trade with
bondholders, so that the e⁄ect on SR and EP remains very small: distribution risk alone
is not able to produce a signi￿cant SR or any risk premium. The high correlation between
pro￿ts and investment prospects implies that shareholders can smooth consumption without
large ￿ uctuations in the short rate.
On the other hand, if one considers productivity shocks as the only source of risk, the
model does generate a signi￿cant risk premium of 3.44. However, this version also implies
a perfect correlation between wages and output. When combining the two types of shocks
with a negative correlation -as we do in the benchmark model-, the risk premium is further
enhanced, wages are much less correlated with output and the wage share becomes more
volatile.
Finally, we also consider a version of the model which incorporates two types of demand
shocks: exogenous or ￿scal demand shocks and monetary policy shocks. These shocks in-
crease the volatility in the aggregate demand components, especially investment, and lower
their correlation with output. The high volatility and output-correlation of consumption is
not resolved. In line with the data, the volatility of hours worked also increases, and the cor-
relation with output improves as well. The wage statistics are not altered much compared to
the benchmark model. The extra volatility in the economy appears also in the risk premium
on equity, which increases to 5.61%, and a higher price of risk (0.26). Overall, augmenting
the model with a more complete stochastic structure, helps to approach the data statistics
along some dimensions.
4 Decomposition of the Risk Premium for Equity and
Bond Returns
In the benchmark model, the risk premium is signi￿cantly higher for equity than for bonds
(4.77 for equity versus 1.99 for the excess holding period return on the 10 year bond). This
di⁄erence is explained by the di⁄erence in the payout risk of both assets. In order to illustrate
this, it is helpful to decompose the risk premium related to any future income stream (dt+k)
in its two components: the covariance between the expected stochastic discount factor and
the marginal utility of the shareholder on the one hand, and the covariance between the
future income stream and the marginal utility on the other (see Jermann (1998) for a more
detailed discussion of this decomposition and Appendix C).
RP(dt+k) = ￿cov(Et+1￿t+k ￿ ￿t+1;￿t+1) ￿ cov(Et+1dt+k;￿t+1)
The returns on bond and equity investments can be written as weighted sums of their
future income streams, and their risk premium can also be expressed as weighted averages of
the corresponding covariance terms. The contribution of the ￿rst covariance term is common
to stock and bonds and so any di⁄erence in their premiums has to be explained by di⁄erences
in the payout risk. For a nominal bond, the payout uncertainty is only a⁄ected by the future
in￿ ation realizations, while for equity the payout risk is determined by the uncertainty in
25Figure 3: Decomposition of the Risk Premium on Equity and Bonds



























Figure 3 provides more detail on the di⁄erent components of the risk premium in the
benchmark model. Figure 3a displays the two covariance terms that appear in the formula
above, for the dividend stream at di⁄erent horizons (expressed in quarters). The stochastic
discount factor component increases smoothly with the horizon, while the payout premium
is hump shaped re￿ ecting the pro￿le in the response of the dividend stream to the shocks.
The payout risk is clearly dominant for the equity premium, which is a weighted average
of these covariance terms. Figure 3b provides the same information for the bond premium.
Here, the SDF uncertainty is relatively more important at least for longer horizon bonds.
The payout or in￿ ation premium is dominant for short horizon bonds, but for longer bonds
makes up only one third of the total premium.
The dividend stream is a⁄ected by the operational risk, which was discussed in the
previous sections, and by the ￿nancial risk that results from the debt ￿nancing of ￿rms:
the outstanding debt is assumed to remain a constant fraction of 30% of the capital stock.
This ￿nancial leverage increases the volatility of dividends (after interest payments) and
therefore also the risk premium on equity, while leaving the SR una⁄ected. In a model
that disregards the ￿nancial leverage the premium on stocks is much smaller while the bond
premium is una⁄ected (respectively 3.45 and 1.99). So the ￿nancial leverage adds 1.32% to
the equity risk premium. On the other hand, ￿nancial leverage reduces the sensitivity of the
real dividend stream to in￿ ation ￿ uctuations in our model: with productivity shocks, the
in￿ ation rate is higher during recessions, which reduces the real cost of debt and stabilizes
the real dividend.
18For technical reasons, we can only calculate the real return for equity, while it is possible to work with
nominal returns for bonds. So we are not able to discuss the nominal premium in equity returns.
265 Time Variation in the Risk Premium
For analyzing average risk premiums, a second order approximation to the policy function is
su¢ cient. Here, we are interested in time variation in the risk premium of the model, and thus
need to use at least one order of approximation higher than a second order approximation.
In this section we use a third order approximation to the policy function. We then simulate
the model with the historical shocks for the productivity and the distribution risk over the
period 1947-2007.
5.1 Cyclical Nature of Risk
Figure 4 shows the risk premiums generated by the model based on the historical series
of productivity and distribution shocks. Table 7 measures the comovement of the various
(expected and realized) premiums with the business cycle as well as their volatilities. Di⁄er-
ences in statistics relative to the earlier calibration results arise for two main reasons: ￿rst,
the present results are based on a higher (third) order approximation. Second, the results
here are model outcomes based on the estimated historical shocks.
Figure 4: Time-Varying Risk Premiums




























EHPR Nominal 10-Year Bond
EHPR Real 10-Year Bond
Term Premium Nom. 10-Year Bond
Note: The graph shows model implied expected one period returns for stocks, nominal and
real bonds (10 year maturity). The term premium = y40
t ￿ y40￿
t , where y40￿
t is the risk
neutral yield. The premiums are expressed in annualized percentages, i.e. quarterly model
concepts are multiplied by 400.
27Table 7: Time-Varying Risk Premiums
Measure of premium Unconditional Std. Dev. Output Corr.
Equity (excess, expected) Et(rt+1￿r
f
t+1) 0.86 -0.91
Equity (excess, realized) rt+1￿r
f
t+1 51.82 -0.29
Real Bond (excess, expected) Et(hprt+1) 0.08 -0.78
Real Bond (excess, realized) hprt+1 14.35 -0.10
Nominal Bond (excess, expected) Et(hpr
nom
t+1 ) 0.12 -0.88
Nominal Bond (excess, realized) hprnom
t+1 19.06 -0.14
Term Premium (realized) y40
t ￿y40￿
t 0.24 -0.88
Slope Yield Curve y40
t ￿Rnom
t 1.98 0.62
Figure 4 illustrates that the model generates quite some time variation in the equity and
bond premium. There is no immediate counterpart in the data for these expected return
series and related conditional moments. We compare our results to a number of proxies and
results of contemporary models. For equity, Brav et al. (2003) and S￿derlind (2008) analyze
variations in ex ante measures of expected returns, based on analyst survey and options data.
The former obtain an average expected return Etrt+1 of around 20% for the period 1975-
2001. S￿derlind￿ s survey data suggest an average expected excess return Et(rt+1 ￿ r
f
t+1) of
about 3.25% while the conditional volatility of returns ￿t(rt+1) is around 16%. The average
of the model expected risk premium in Figure 4 is close to that of S￿derlind. The conditional
standard deviation of the stock return ￿t(rt+1) in the model, plotted in Figure 6, is slightly
above 30% on average.
For bonds, the model produces an expected holding period return on nominal 10 year
bonds of 1.71 (Figure 4). The degree of time variation in expected excess bond returns
on bonds is limited (Table 7). Again, there are no immediate measures in the data to
compare these to. Relative to estimated models such as Du⁄ee (2002), Dewachter (2008)
and Campbell et al. (2008) the magnitude of ￿ uctuations in expected returns is small. By
contrast, realized return average and variation are substantial in the model and compare
well to -observable- measures of, e.g., Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) and Campbell et al.
(2008). We also compute the term premium in the manner of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2008), calculated as the yield di⁄erence between the 10 year bond and its risk neutral
counterpart. We ￿nd that in the present model, this measure for the term premium is
somewhat higher on average (1.77) and lower in volatility (0.24) than in their model (0.75
and 0.43, respectively). Finally, note that there is an ex ante premium for bearing the
in￿ ation risk of holding nominal bonds of about 25 basis points (Figure 4).
We now turn to the cyclical properties of these risk premiums. All the risk premiums are
highly correlated and countercyclical: the correlation of each of them with linearly detrended
output is around -0.8 to -0.9 (Table 7). Figure 4 shows how model risk premiums increase
at the onset of recession periods, possibly with the exception of the 2001 recession which
seems to be anticipated already one year in advance. The countercyclicality of risk premiums
is consistent with both theory and evidence in the ￿nance literature. Risk averse investors
should require high returns when their marginal utility of consumption is high. Predictive
regressions, for instance, also suggest expected returns are high in "bad" times.
28Figure 5: Conditional Volatility of Shareholder Consumption Growth






























Note: The conditional volatility of consumption growth is the conditional standard deviation
of consumption growth. The quarterly model concept is annualized by multiplying by 400.
It is noteworthy that the patterns of time variation in the ex ante equity return survey
measures of S￿derlind (2008) and, in particular, Brav. et al (2003) look very similar to that
of Figure 4. The dynamics of the term premium, too, correspond with the general time-series
pro￿le detected in other studies of the term premium (as summarized in Rudebusch et al.
(2007)). It seems to hold generally that, from the early eighties onward, the various measures
indicate a gradual decrease.
It is useful to try to understand this time variability in the model a bit further. We know
from the results in Section 4 that, on average, payout risk is the largest contributor to the
equity premium. The bond premium is solely driven by SDF uncertainty, and is therefore
substantially smaller. Similarly, time variability in risk premiums can work through two
channels: the risk premium is the product of the price and the amount of risk, both of which
can vary through time. Below, we provide variations in the di⁄erent components of the risk
premiums.
First, there is the time variation in the compensation for risk that the shareholders
expect in return for bearing part of the aggregate risk. This corresponds to time variation
in the price of risk, which is summarized in the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio itself is
a function of the volatility of marginal utility, as well as its comovement with the asset￿ s
payo⁄. In the present model, the shareholders￿e⁄ective risk aversion is virtually constant.
The reason is that the shareholders are extremely wealthy (see the wealth distribution of
29Figure 6: Conditional Volatility of Stock and Bond Returns






























Note: The conditional volatility of asset returns is the conditional standard deviation of the
returns. The quarterly model concept is annualized by multiplying by 400.
the three agents). As a result, time variation in the Sharpe ratio is fully driven by variation
in the conditional volatility of consumption.19 Figure 5 shows this conditional volatility
of shareholder consumption growth and, in particular, its countercyclical nature. All risk
premiums share this component. Hence, variation in consumption growth volatility is the
driving force between the comovement of the various risk premiums of Figure 4.
Second, there is time variation in the amount of aggregate risk the shareholders bear
across the cycle. The latter is summarized in the expected variability of the returns. Here
lies the main explanation for the time variation and the overall magnitudes of risk premiums,
as well as the relative di⁄erences in them between stocks and bonds. Figure 6 shows the
conditional volatilities for the various assets in our model economy.
Clearly, the return volatility for stocks varies substantially over the business cycle. For
bonds, this is much less the case. Moreover, in the baseline model, the compensation for
in￿ ation risk is almost constant over the cycle. Variations in the conduct of monetary policy
will render this type of risk more important. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) incorporate
long run in￿ ation risk by means of time variation in the in￿ ation target of the central bank.
Later, we consider related extensions.
19For the heterogeneous agent model with GHH preferences, the labor e⁄ect is quantitatively not very
important.
305.2 Impact on Prediction Performance of P/D and Yield Spread
Predictability regressions for stock returns and bond returns are often used as tests for time-
varying risk premiums. In this section we repeat the standard predictability regressions on
the model-implied data in order to test whether our time-varying risk premiums can generate
the same type of results as typically found in the data.
Stock Return Predictability
Stock returns in the data vary over the cycle, and seem to be forecastable by a variety of
variables. Financial ratios are particularly successful in predicting future returns. Moreover,
these ￿nancial ratios are tied to general business cycle conditions (see, e.g., Fama and French,
1989). The price-dividend ratio (pt￿dt, where small case letters denote logs) is probably the




r(pt ￿ dt)t + "t (11)
typically ￿nd signi￿cantly negative estimates for ￿
r and high R2, and both tend to in-
crease (in absolute value) as the forecasting horizon h becomes longer. There is a large
amount of evidence suggesting that one should be wary of the statistical properties of re-
gressions like these, mostly due to the persistence of the right hand side variable. Cochrane
(2008b) and Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) are two recent examples that show how
the basic ￿nding of predictability remains despite many of the statistical artefacts.21
The left-hand panel of Table 8 replicates the above ￿nding for the sample period 1947-
2007. In the right-hand panel we perform the same regressions based on data generated by the
model. Guvenen (2008) performs the same exercise. As in the latter study, the table shows
that the present model, too, reproduces the main patterns found in predictive regressions.
More so than in Guvenen (2008), however, the table suggests there is a signi￿cant amount of
predictability in excess returns in the simulated data, which is consistent with the predictive
regressions here and in the aforementioned studies.
Campbell-Shiller Regressions
The time variation in the risk premium for bonds is usually tested using the Campbell and
Shiller (1991, CS) regressions:22





t ) + et (12)
Under the null of the expectations hypothesis, i.e. of a constant term premium ￿ = 1. In
Table 9, we present the results of this regression applied to historical data for the ten-year
bond yield, where the LHS of the regression is approximated by (yn;t+1￿yn;t). The estimated
beta coe¢ cient is -3.8, which is signi￿cantly lower than the null hypothesis of ￿ = 1: When
20For a more complete list of variables and papers studying them, we refer the reader to Lettau and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2008).
21For a more comprehensive overview, see, e.g., Cochrane (2008a).
22There is another version of the test of the expectations hypothesis which uses forward rates instead of
yields, see Fama and Bliss (1987). We do not take this approach here.
31Table 8: Predictive Regressions: Stocks
Data Model
Return Horizon Beta t-stat R2 Beta t-stat R2
Returns
4 -0.124 -5.082 0.099 -0.180 -4.816 0.089
10 -0.288 -8.105 0.223 -0.399 -7.808 0.210
20 -0.560 -11.275 0.367 -0.779 -12.153 0.403
40 -1.338 -15.115 0.534 -1.235 -18.566 0.634
Excess Returns
4 -0.130 -5.352 0.109 -0.104 -2.684 0.030
10 -0.293 -8.450 0.238 -0.243 -4.250 0.073
20 -0.548 -11.786 0.388 -0.575 -7.135 0.189
40 -1.287 -17.047 0.594 -1.136 -11.718 0.401
Note: Regressions of log returns on log dividend yield. Horizon in quarters. Model
dividend yield based on steady state level dividends. Data: see note Table 3.
testing this regression for the simulated data of the model, using the historical realizations of
the two shocks, we follow Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), and adjust the above expression,
which holds for a zero-coupon bond of maturity n, to hold for our decaying coupon perpetuity
with duration n. The CS regression (12) becomes:
log(p
n
t ) ￿ log(p
n
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where pn
t the bond price, yn
t its yield and Rnom
t the nominal short interest rate: Under the
expectations hypothesis ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, i.e. the coe¢ cients in the above regression have
the same interpretation as in the standard zero-coupon case. The estimated value for beta
is 0.98 and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one. Also the R2 in the model is lower than in the
data. Repeating the exercise for the real bonds delivers a lower estimate of 0.73, but still
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one.
Table 9: Predictive Regressions: Bonds
Data Model
Horizon Beta t-stat R2 Beta t-stat R2
Nominal Yields
40 -3.797 2.831 0.032 0.982 1.734 0.0124
Real Yields
40 - - - 0.735 1.352 0.007
Note: Regressions of yield change on spread for the data and minus
log price change on spread for the model. Horizon in quarters.
Data: see note Table 3.
The deviation from the expectation hypothesis (EH) is determined by the covariance of
the spread with the excess holding period return on the bond relative to the variance of the
spread: To understand why the model is not successful in generating larger deviations from
32the expectation hypothesis, this term can be further decomposed in the covariance term for






















￿0:018 = 0:059 ￿ 0:077
Three elements explain the model￿ s inability to reproduce the CS puzzle. First, the
model tends to overestimate the variance of the spread: the standard deviation in the data
is 1.13 against 1.98 in the model. Given that this variance appears in the denominator, it
makes it harder to generate large deviations from EH. Second, the covariance between the
term premium, yn
t ￿ yn￿
t ; and the next period return on the bond is small. This is a clear
sign that the time variation in the bond risk premium is not su¢ ciently strong to generate
large deviations from EH. Finally, the covariance between the risk neutral spread and the
excess holding period return is negative, which o⁄sets the contribution of the risk premium
covariance on the estimated beta. The negative covariance in the spread and the holding
period return is mainly related to the fact that the spread is procyclical in the model, while
the (expected) holding period return is countercyclical. Our procyclical spread is certainly
related to the fact that the model is only driven by two supply shocks, which tend to move
in￿ ation and the interest rate, and more so for the short rate, in the opposite direction of
output. This is especially the case for the nominal spread because in￿ ation is exclusively
forward looking and jumps on impact, but less so for the real spread. In sum, to increase
the deviation from the EH for the bond yields, the volatility in the bond risk premium
should increase relative to the volatility in the spread, and the spread should be much less
procyclical, in line with what is observed in the data.
6 Two Further Applications
6.1 Risk Premiums and the Great Moderation
In our model, risk premiums are consistent with the stochastic discount factor of the marginal
investor and the behavior of the payouts on the assets. The average magnitude and the time
variation in the risk premiums depend crucially on the volatility of these two determinants.
These latter volatilities are themselves consistent with the overall volatility in the economy,
and with the allocation of the macroeconomic risk and the implied behavior of the income
distribution, in particular. The decline in the macroeconomic volatility since 1984 is by now
widely documented in the literature. The strong decline in the volatility of the exogenous
shocks in the model was discussed the calibration section, where we observed a 50% decline
in the productivity shocks and a 20% decline in the distribution risk for the more recent
period. Therefore, it is interesting to evaluate the implications of this reduction in overall
macroeconomic risk for our ￿nancial risk premiums. In order to do so, we evaluate the
implied risk premium of our model for two di⁄erent parameterizations of the stochastic
processes: a high volatility regime that corresponds with the pre-1984 subsample and a low
33volatility regime that corresponds with the post-1984 period. Table 10 summarizes these
results and compares the outcomes with the empirically observed statistics for the ￿nancial
and the real macroeconomic variables.
Table 10: Financial Statistics for High and Low Volatility Regime
SR EP BP yf￿Rn Rf ￿Rf ￿RS ￿￿
Benchmark Model 0.24 4.77 1.99 1.56 1.20 3.50 20.18 3.00
Data 0.39 6.11 - 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 2.62
pre-84 subsample 0.39 6.07 - 1.15 0.53 3.06 15.50 3.11
post-84 subsample 0.40 6.17 - 1.65 2.29 1.97 15.57 0.96
High volatility (pre-84) 0.28 6.43 2.67 2.12 0.25 4.02 23.40 3.40
Low volatility (post-84) 0.15 1.97 0.84 0.61 2.89 2.40 13.11 2.20
Table 11: Macroeconomic Statistics for High and Low Volatility Regime
￿Y ￿I ￿I;Y ￿C ￿C;Y ￿N ￿N;Y ￿W ￿W;Y ￿WN=Y ￿WN=Y;Y
Benchmark Model 1.86 3.31 0.93 1.59 0.98 0.82 0.94 0.63 0.55 2.37 -0.28
Data 1.70 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
pre-84 subsample 2.03 5.47 0.74 1.36 0.78 1.52 0.88 0.56 0.20 1.39 -0.40
post-84 subsample 0.92 3.79 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.97 0.85 1.03 -0.10 1.29 -0.08
High volatility (pre-84) 2.19 3.82 0.93 1.88 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.72 0.59 2.75 -0.29
Low volatility (post-84) 1.09 2.19 0.86 0.94 0.95 0.51 0.91 0.51 0.32 1.59 -0.27
The simulation results with the model show a 50% decline in volatility of aggregate out-
put and consumption in line with the decline in aggregate productivity risk. Investment and
employment volatilities decline slightly less, while the wage and the labor share volatility
decline by only 30% and 40%. The risk premiums which are consistent with this macroeco-
nomic moderation change even more. The equity premium drops with 70% from 6.43 for
the pre-1984 period to 1.97 for the post-1984 period. The volatility of the return to equity
decreases less than 50% and so does the corresponding SR. The excess return on bonds is
also very sensitive and drops by more than 70%, while the implied yield spread drops from
2.12% to 0.61%.
So the model generates a huge impact of the Great Moderation on the ￿nancial risk
premiums. Note, however, that these results show the impact of such a regime switch on the
steady state outcomes. These results should not be compared directly with the historical
realized returns over the two subperiods. the reason is that the transition dynamics will imply
dynamics in the return that work in the opposite direction: in going from a high risk to a
low risk regime, returns will temporarily increase during the transition period. The exercise
presented here is also based on the hypothesis that the agents in the economy consider this
drop in the average volatility since 1984 as a permanent drop. In reality, investors might be
34uncertain whether this decline is permanent, and may take into consideration the possibility
that the high volatility regime will re-appear in the future. Such an exercise would require
an evaluation based on a stochastic volatility process or a regime-switching setting.
In reality, the subjective perception of the macro economic uncertainty by the investors
might also shift depending on the realization of the shocks or the state of the economy
and this might also lead to sudden reversals in the required risk premiums. This type of
additional uncertainty and volatility was absent in our analysis of the time variation in the
risk premium, and the results in this section suggest that the implications of this additional
source of variability can be relatively large in magnitude. Taking into account a stochastic
model structure is therefore an extremely promising extension of the exercise performed here,
but falls outside the scope of this paper.
6.2 Risk Premiums, In￿ ation Dynamics and Monetary Policy
The benchmark model retains a monetary policy rule that responds aggressively to in￿ ation
deviations from a ￿xed target, in order to have a reasonable ￿t for the volatility of in￿ a-
tion. With such a policy rule and with simple price adjustment costs, that generate a purely
forward looking Phillips curve, it is di¢ cult to capture the great in￿ ation and the high per-
sistence of in￿ ation observed during the seventies and eighties. To reproduce this experience
and to analyze its impact on the risk premium -especially on the nominal component- we
here consider several alternative speci￿cations for the monetary policy rule and for the price
adjustment costs. In a ￿rst experiment, we decrease the long-run reaction coe¢ cient to
in￿ ation in the policy rule (r￿) from 3 to 1.5. In a second variant, we model the perceived
in￿ ation target as a persistent process (￿￿ =0.995) that adjusts slowly to the actual in￿ ation
rate with a coe¢ cient of 0.03, but we keep the variance of exogenous shocks to the perceived
in￿ ation target at zero:
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ + ￿￿￿t￿1 + 0:03 ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿t) + "
￿
t (13)
Both exercises imply a stronger and more persistent response of in￿ ation to the endoge-
nous in￿ ation pressure in the model. In a third experiment, we introduce exogenous shocks
to the perceived in￿ ation process with a std. dev. ￿￿ = 0:10: Finally, we consider a case
in which the in￿ ation adjustment costs are smaller, such that in￿ ation adjusts faster. The
results of these experiments are presented in Table 12.
Table 12: Alternative Financial Statistics
SR EP BP yf￿Rf Rf ￿Rf ￿RS ￿￿
Benchmark Model 0.24 4.77 1.99 1.56 1.20 3.50 20.18 3.00
Data 0.39 6.11 - 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 2.62
Lower in￿ ation response 0.23 4.46 3.00 2.17 1.31 3.55 19.24 5.92
Endog. in￿ ation target 0.24 4.70 2.71 1.88 1.23 3.50 19.95 4.08
Exog. in￿ ation target 0.24 4.77 1.94 1.25 1.21 3.52 20.19 4.98
No price adj.costs 0.25 5.24 2.06 1.61 0.96 3.82 21.29 4.24
35Table 13: Alternative Macroeconomic Statistics
￿Y ￿I ￿I;Y ￿C ￿C;Y ￿N ￿N;Y ￿W ￿W;Y ￿WN=Y ￿WN=Y;Y
Benchmark Model 1.86 3.31 0.93 1.59 0.98 0.82 0.94 0.63 0.55 2.37 -0.28
Data 1.70 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
Lower in￿ ation response 1.81 3.25 0.91 1.56 0.98 0.84 0.88 0.65 0.55 2.40 -0.27
Endog. in￿ ation target 1.85 3.29 0.92 1.59 0.98 0.82 0.92 0.64 0.55 2.38 -0.28
Exog. in￿ ation target 1.87 3.33 0.93 1.61 0.98 0.84 0.94 0.64 0.55 2.44 -0.28
No price adj.costs 2.03 3.45 0.96 1.73 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.61 0.59 2.34 -0.28
All four alternative speci￿cations a⁄ect the risk premium on bonds, but the exact mech-
anism through which this happens di⁄ers from case to case. In the ￿rst scenario, monetary
policy allows a larger and a more persistent in￿ ation response to the fundamental shocks by
responding less to the realized in￿ ation rate. Investors adjust their in￿ ation expectations
accordingly and the bond price and the long term bond yield will also become more sensitive
to the shocks. Bond prices increase following a positive productivity shock, so that they
tend to comove strongly with the consumption of the bond- and shareholders. Therefore,
these investors will require a higher risk premium to hold the bond, which appears also in a
higher spread in the term structure. The increased risk premium is related to the increased
uncertainty about future real payout risk of the bond, so it is mainly the in￿ ation component
of the premium that increases. In fact, under this policy rule, the contribution of the real
term premium decreases, which also explains why the equity premium drops. The lower
premium on equity is also explained by the fact that higher in￿ ation reduces the real cost of
the outstanding debt of the ￿rms. This mechanism tends to stabilize the real dividends and
the return to capital.
With the endogenously adjusting perceived in￿ ation target, in￿ ation and the policy reac-
tion will not change that much relative to the benchmark model on impact, but expectations
about long term in￿ ation are becoming more sensitive to the shocks. As a consequence,
nominal bond prices and yields will also be very sensitive to the shocks. So in this scenario,
we ￿nd again an increase in the nominal premium, relative to the benchmark, while the real
component is more or less una⁄ected. The results are very di⁄erent for the exogenous target
shocks. In￿ ation becomes more volatile, and as the target process is very persistent, the
in￿ ation expectations and therefore the bond yields and prices are also much more volatile,
but this does not translate into a higher nominal premium. The reason for this result is that
in￿ ation target shocks, for instance a disin￿ ation shock, tend to raise the real short rate in
the short run. With nominal price rigidity, actual in￿ ation will not immediately jump to the
new in￿ ation target, and monetary policy will keep the real interest rate temporarily high,
which will induce a drop in aggregate demand and consumption. As a result, marginal util-
ity and bond prices will be positively correlated in the short run, and bond prices o⁄er the
bondholders a hedge against this type of in￿ ation risk. Therefore, exogenous target in￿ ation
shocks do not require a higher nominal premium, and they can result in a lower term spread
(see also Gallmeyer et al. (2007)).
Lower price adjustment costs change the pro￿le of the in￿ ation process, as in￿ ation will
36be much less persistent and prices adjust quicker to their desired levels. But the long term
price level ￿ uctuations will not change drastically and the payout risk for nominal bonds
is therefore not signi￿cantly a⁄ected either. Less short run deviations in the real marginal
costs tend to stabilize the pro￿t/wage shares as well. But the faster adjustment of demand
and production (which are no longer characterized by the hump shaped reaction and instead
jump on impact) drives up the wedge between the spot wage and the desired smooth contract
wage. The larger insurance component in the contract reinforces the cyclicality of the pro￿t
share, and substitutes for the variable mark-up as the main source for the variability in
pro￿ts.
7 Conclusions
The objective of this research is to build a DSGE model that is able to ￿t well both on
the real and the ￿nancial side of the economy. The analysis of this paper illustrates that
a heterogeneous agent model can be a useful alternative to the standard representative
agent model for modelling jointly the real and the ￿nancial side of the economy. Starting
from a realistic classi￿cation of households in three groups, portfolio investors, bondholders
and workers who di⁄er from each other in terms of capital market participation and risk
aversion, our model generates high risk premiums and reasonable dynamics for the intra-
and intertemporal allocation decisions. There are two important ingredients for generating
the high risk premiums. Firstly, the concentration of consumption risk in the group of
shareholders results in high prices of risk. Secondly, the labor contract and the countercyclical
mark-ups result in a high volatility of capital returns. The bond market allows shareholders
to redistribute some of this risk to a larger group of bondholders, but the overall impact of
this risk sharing mechanism remains moderate. This is due to di⁄erences in the risk aversion
and because workers have no incentive to participate in this market given their e¢ cient labor
contract.
The model also generates a signi￿cant degree of countercyclical time variation in the
risk premiums. The time variation in the equity premium is consistent with the empirically
observed predictive power of price-dividend ratio￿ s for future stock returns as well as more
direct proxies of expected returns. The term premium on long bonds also displays some
time variation but less than typically found in empirical models of the bond spread and
insu¢ cient to explain the predictive power of the spread for future excess returns on bonds.
To overcome this problem, future analysis could introduce variations on utility functions (e.g.
habit persistence or stochastic risk aversion) or stochastic volatility in macroeconomic risk
to reinforce the variation in the price of risk, which is the main driver for bond premiums.
For future work, it would also be interesting to complete the stochastic structure of the
model and to estimate the model on the data. Recent progress in higher order estimation
methods suggests that such an exercise will become feasible soon. However, a complete
higher order approximation of the model is probably not necessary given the limited size of
the feedback e⁄ects from the risk premiums on the real economy. In order to increase these
feedback e⁄ects, one could consider a model switching framework, in which the parameters
of the model can also change in line with the stochastic risks that hit the economy. Alter-
natively, one could add ￿nancial frictions to the model so that the required risk premiums
37have ￿rst order e⁄ects on consumption and investment decisions. A joint ￿t of the ￿nancial
and the real data will imply a strong validation test for the model. It remains to be seen
how the heterogeneous agent setting performs in explaining the real variables relative to the
representative agent models which are now standard in New-Keynesian monetary models
(e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007)). In that respect, it is important to stress that the model is
able to generate endogenously the observed real wage rigidity as the result from an e¢ cient
risk sharing arrangement between workers and ￿rms. This view on wage rigidity was popular
in the late seventies, and recently regained support from micro studies on wage dynamics
and their reaction to transitory ￿rm-speci￿c shocks (Guiso et al. (2005)).
Furthermore, our model has important implications for the distribution of income and
risks across di⁄erent groups of agents. It would be interesting to develop the welfare im-
plications of this model: how is the cost of business cycles and in￿ ation allocated over the
di⁄erent agents? The implications of the model for the wealth distribution can also be helpful
to re￿ne the calibration of the model.
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41A Derivation of the First Order Conditions for the
Model
A.1 Households




























































































































































































































































Type 3 Agents: Workers
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Nt (i) = N1;t (i) + N2;t (i) + N3;t (i)
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The real marginal cost (rmct) equals the spot wage divided by marginal productivity of labor.




A.3 The Labor Contract
The wage contract solves:
maxEt fvtU1 (C1;t;N1;t) + (1 ￿ vt)U3 (C3;t;N3;t)g









































































45B Asset Pricing in Log-Linear Framework
A large body of literature on asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics uses ￿rst-order
approximate solutions to derive asset prices and premiums. This literature started with
Campbell (1994) and Jermann (1998). They assume that the variables are lognormally
distributed, and that the ￿rst order approximation is good. The returns are derived from









with ￿ and R the shadow value of wealth and the asset return, respectively.
B.1 Real Risk Free Rate


























with ￿ = ln￿ and r
short = lnR
short
0 = ln￿ + Et
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because ￿rshort;t = 0
The unconditional expectation then becomes:
r






















. The last term appears because
although Rshort
t+1 is known at t and has, therefore a zero conditional variance, it is still a
random variable whose unconditional variance is non-zero.
B.2 Nominal Short Rate


























with ￿ = ln￿ and r
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because ￿rshort;t = 0
B.3 Equity Premium
The equity premium is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the nominal stock and the nominal
risk free rate.
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short = ￿￿M￿s;rstock￿M￿s￿rstock + ￿￿;rstock￿￿￿rstock
B.4 Term Premium
The term premium is the di⁄erence between the nominal short term bond and the nominal
long term bond.
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So that the di⁄erence between the long-term bond return and the short-term riskless bond,
or the term premium is:
r
long ￿ r
short = ￿￿M￿s;rlong￿M￿s￿rlong + ￿￿;rlong￿￿￿rlong
B.5 Sharpe Ratio
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C Equity Premium Decomposition in Payout Risk, SDF
Risk and In￿ ation Risk








on an asset that pays a dividend Dt+k (a strip) at time t + k in














= ￿cov (￿t+1;Et+1dt+k) (14)
￿cov(￿t+1;Et+1￿t+k ￿ ￿t+1)






t;t+1 is the return on the strip, R
f
t+1 is the real risk free rate, ￿t+1 is in￿ ation and
pt+1 is the log price level. The ￿rst term is the premium that arises from payout uncertainty,
the second term arises from uncertainty in future marginal utility and the last four terms
arise only when there is in￿ ation in the model.








where Vt [Dt+k] =
￿kEt[Dt+k￿t+k=Pt+k]
￿t=Pt : Then,
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Et [￿t+k ￿ ￿t + dt+k ￿ pt+k + pt] +
1
2
Vt [￿t+k + dt+k ￿ pt+k + pt]
￿
Given that the real return on a one-period bond Rt;t+1 [1t+1] is the risk free rate R
f
t , we have:
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￿exp(￿covt (￿t+1;Et+1dt+k) ￿ covt(￿t+1;Et+1￿t+k ￿ ￿t+1) + covt (￿t+1;Et+1pt+k ￿ pt+1)
￿exp(covt (pt+1;Et+1dt+k) + covt (pt+1;Et+1￿t+k) + covt (pt+1;Et+1pt+k))
Taking logs, we recover equation (14).
The return on an asset that pays a streamof payouts Dt+k over k periods, Rt;t+1 [fDt+kg
1
k=1],









wt [Dt+k] ￿ exp(RP (dt+k))
where wt [Dt+k] =
Vt[Dt+k] P1
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50D Bond yields












From a computational point of view this iteration can be problematic when evaluating longer
maturity bonds. So instead of using (16) we follow Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) and
approximate the price of the zero-coupon n￿maturity bond by the price of a perpetuity
whose coupon is 1 this period and then depreciates at a rate of ￿c. This rate of decay is
chosen to set the perpetuity duration equal to the maturity of the zero-coupon bond.
The price of the perpetuity is:
P
B;n









The coupon is a geometrically declining function of ￿c and ￿c is such that the Macaulay














is equal to 10 years. The denominator is the current bond price, and discounting uses the
model￿ s steady state risk free rate denoted here by rf_ss. The perpetuity face value M is
zero. For a steady state nominal rate of RN_ss = 0:01=1:01 per quarter, ￿c is set to 0.9947
to approximate a 40-period zero-coupon bond.























to take into account the fact that the coupon payed today can be re-invested at the one
period nominal rate Rnom
t . The spread and the (expected) excess holding period return are










t = ynt ￿ R
nom
t
Term premia TPt are de￿ned as the di⁄erence the bond yield and its risk neutral counterpart,
TPt = ynt ￿ e ynt
51where risk neutral prices e P n
t are de￿ned by
e P
n








and risk neutral bond yields e ynt are given by:
e ynt ￿ log
 





To obtain the Campbell and Shiller regression for the perpetuity, start from (17) , use
(19) to replace (P n
t ￿ 1) and take logs:
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and take logs of the 1st order approximation of the above equation :
ynt = Et log(P
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